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King of Spies: The Dark Reign of America’s Spymaster in 
Korea. By Blaine Hardin. New York, Viking, 2017. ISBN: 978-0-
525-42993-7. Photographs. Notes. Sources cited. Index. Pp. xii, 
260. $27.00. 
Blaine Harden is a New York Times bestselling author who has written 
several books about events on the Korean Peninsula.  His 2012 bestseller, 
Escape From Camp 14, told the story of a much tortured North Korean man, 
Shin Dong-hyuk, who eventually escaped his country’s gulag system and 
defected to the South in 2006. It later transpired that Shin’s tale, as it was 
related to Harden, was less than fully truthful.  Subsequent editions of the 
book included an updated Foreword clarifying some of the fictitious aspects of 
Shin’s story. Harden faced fewer complications in King of Spies. While some 
of the stories it contains are from oral interviews and are not corroborated by 
other sources, the bulk of the tale is based on Harden’s painstaking research 
into the shadowy world of an Air Force sergeant who somehow managed to 
talk his way into the inner sanctum of the South Korean government in the 
late 1940s by winning the trust and confidence of the president, Syngman 
Rhee. The story of how the relatively untutored sergeant, Donald P. Nichols, 
rose to such prominence is truly a fascinating one, and it was one that Nichols 
himself tried to tell in a 1981 self-published autobiography. Like Shin, Nichols 
sometimes embellished his role and twisted the facts, but the truth in his 
story is sufficiently enthralling and it requires no fantasies to make it so.  
Harden skillfully sifted fact from fiction, uncovering documentary sources 
and interviewing those who knew Nichols, to present the narrative of his 
incredibly adventurous life and career. 
 
Harden first stumbled across Nichols’ name while researching a book about a 
former North Korean fighter pilot who defected in the spring of 1950, by 
flying his Soviet-made Ilyushin IL-10 ground attack fighter to a U. S. airfield 
in the South. The first person the pilot was able to speak to in his own 
language was the Air Force’s Don Nichols, the high school dropout who ran a 
spy ring that was so successful it ingratiated him with President Rhee and 
made him one of the most powerful men in the country. How that came to be 
is a tale that is superbly told by Harden. 
 
Nichols came from a broken home. His promiscuous mother deserted the 
family and left his father brokenhearted, so times were frequently tough 
during the Depression. Seeking to escape the poverty and hunger he knew in 
his youth, Nichols joined the Army in 1940.  He served in India during World 
War II, working in a motor pool in Karachi and later volunteering in the 
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understaffed morgue where he embalmed his fellow servicemen who had 
succumbed to accident or disease. Later Nichols was accepted for training for 
the Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) in Tokyo and was assigned to 
South Korea upon graduation in 1946. He reported to the tiny CIC 
detachment at Kimpo Airfield and found that South Korea was then 
embroiled in a violent civil war pitting an anti-communist Right against the 
communist Left.  Anti-American sentiment ran high as well.  A bloody 
uprising took place that fall, leading to mass arrests of leftists.  The Army 
commander in Korea ordered CIC to go on the offensive, engaging in positive 
intelligence operations in an effort to develop information about North 
Korean and other communist agitators in the South.   Nichols embraced that 
mission with relish.   According to his version of the story, Nichols began his 
relationship with Syngman Rhee around that time, recognizing the immense 
intelligence benefits to be derived from such close access to government 
sources.  Nichols also began working closely with the Korean National Police, 
witnessing brutal interrogation techniques, torture, and even executions.  He 
seems to have become inured to it, in all likelihood reasoning that the dire 
circumstances justified the means. That attitude would soon pay dividends in 
his running of spy operations behind enemy lines in North Korea when war 
broke out in June 1950. 
 
Nichols’ relationship with Rhee is one of the most puzzling aspects of the 
story, causing one former Air Force historian to wonder why no one at the 
time asked: “What the hell is this twenty-three-year-old air force sergeant 
doing in the role of private confidant to a head of state?” (35).   No one in the 
Defense or State Department ever thought to “place Nichols under the 
meaningful supervision of a senior intelligence official” (35).  By June 1949, 
Rhee wrote to U. S. Ambassador John Muccio, personally requesting that 
Nichols serve as Rhee’s advisor on Air Affairs for an expanding South Korean 
Air Force.  The creation of that air force was greatly encouraged by Nichols, 
who—in direct opposition to U. S. Military wishes—urged the building of a 
separate service divorced from the army, just as the U. S. had done in 1947.  
Rhee acceded to Nichols’ advice, and the low-ranked U. S. Air Force sergeant 
was given unprecedented influence over how that South Korean Air Force 
functioned.  Though Nichols was undoubtedly flattered by his close 
relationship with Rhee, the president was shrewd in deriving benefits from 
the relationship as well.  With the withdrawal of U. S. combat troops from 
South Korea in the summer of 1949, Rhee felt the vulnerability of his meager 
military capability in the face of a much more militant and well equipped 
North.  While Rhee pressured the American government for additional 
military support, he also enlisted Nichols’ aid in using the increasing number 
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of alarming intelligence information reports to bolster his efforts.  Nichols 
dutifully and steadily funneled news of a massive North Korean buildup to his 
superiors, eventually getting the attention of the Far East Air Force 
commander, General George E. Stratemeyer.  The general’s reports of 
Nichols’ warnings finally woke up the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who met at 
the State Department in March 1950, to begin to figure out just how accurate 
Nichols’ detailed reporting was, and whether his dire warnings of impending 
war were realistic. 
 
When the Air Force separated from the Army in 1947, the Army’s former CIC 
agents generally transferred from assignment to the Army Air Forces to the 
new U. S. Air Force. Nichols was one of those CIC agents, but the Air Force 
soon created its own investigative arm, the Air Force Office of Special 
Investigations (AFOSI), which combined criminal and counterintelligence 
investigations under one roof.  Former Army CIC agents then joined former 
Army Criminal Investigations Division agents as co-equals in the new AFOSI. 
That agency had no clearly defined wartime mission that by any stretch of the 
imagination included even half of the things Nichols was doing in Korea.  
Still, backed by his relationship with Rhee and the quality of his intelligence 
reports, no one pressed the issue.   
 
Nichols not only was the first American to interview the defecting North 
Korean pilot, he also convinced the South Koreans to give the pilot’s IL-10 to 
the U. S. and enticed the pilot to work for him as a spy.  By then he operated a 
tiny AFOSI detachment from his very own, separate spy base.  From there he 
recruited, trained, and exploited South Korean spies, sending them into the 
North—many to a certain death.   
 
His support from the National Police also allowed him access to other 
defectors and detainees, from whom he extracted useful intelligence 
information.  His quest for accurate intelligence prompted him to go to North 
Korea himself in 1947, disguised as an Army officer accompanying a special 
train transporting supplies to U. S. negotiators in Pyongyang.  Later he took 
hazardous surveillance flights over the North in unarmed spotter planes to 
see for himself the buildup of North Korean military power.   
 
His reporting was undoubtedly highly accurate, so when it drew the attention 
of the JCS in March 1950, it also drew the attention of General MacArthur’s 
chief of intelligence, Major General Charles A. Willoughby, who—whether out 
of stubbornness, arrogance, or pride—refused to credit Nichols’ work as 
accurate.  Instead, his sycophantic relationship with MacArthur, who believed 
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he had insufficient forces in Japan to even consider the possibility of 
supporting South Korea, caused him to downplay the prospects of an invasion 
of the South.  Both Willoughby and MacArthur conspired to turn a blind eye 
to events on the Korean Peninsula.  Inquiries from the JCS, however, soon 
pushed the issue into the limelight.  Willoughby not only declined to concede 
the accuracy of Nichols’ or other similar reporting from the CIA, he actively 
sought to silence the young AFOSI agent.  Fortunately, Nichols was able to 
deflect the wrath of the vindictive Willoughby because the AFOSI personnel 
were assigned to the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), not to 
MacArthur’s U. S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE).  KMAG took its 
marching orders from the U. S. Ambassador, to whom Willoughby appealed 
unsuccessfully in May 1950, in an attempt to get rid of Nichols. The 
ambassador was more appreciative of Nichols’ intelligence work, not to 
mention his “friendly relationship to key Korean personalities” (55).  He 
defended Nichols’ work, praised the young agent, and in no uncertain terms 
declined to eliminate that source of vital information. 
 
Meanwhile, Nichols made a new friend: Major General Earle E. Partridge, the 
Fifth Air Force commander who led all air operations in the Pacific Theater.  
They first met at the end of 1949, and Partridge would later be totally stunned 
to learn of the threat posed by North Korea, all of which had been reported by 
Nichols.  Willoughby had never passed on any of Nichols’ information to his 
air commander.  Partridge quickly recognized the talents and abilities Nichols 
exhibited, and he would become one of his most avid supporters, but in June 
1950, the Air Force was as unprepared as the other services for the outbreak 
of war in Korea. 
 
Nichols’ warnings were validated on Sunday, June 25, 1950, when North 
Korean artillery opened fire and a phalanx of Soviet-made T-34 tanks rolled 
across the thirty-eighth parallel followed by hordes of North Korean soldiers 
crushing all resistance in their path.  Nichols quickly notified AFOSI 
Headquarters in Tokyo, struggling to make the duty agent understand the 
situation over the poor phone connection.  As MacArthur scrambled to 
respond over the ensuing days, he ordered Partridge to begin air strikes on 
the North.  The General readily agreed to do so, but he quickly realized his 
bombers suffered from a severe handicap.  They had no targeting information 
about North Korea and though fully ready to drop bombs with wild abandon, 
they had no idea what to drop those bombs on.  Nichols quickly stepped into 
that intelligence gap and began to draw on his vast network of resources to 
provide the Air Force with targeting data and maps.  While most American 
military forces in Korean beat a hasty retreat, Nichols and his AFOSI clerk 
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remained behind in Seoul, destroying vital files.  In his autobiography, 
Nichols began at this point to inflate his heroic deeds, many of which were 
later laughingly dismissed by his clerk, Sarbando Torres.  Still, Torres had to 
admit that Nichols “wasn’t afraid of a damn thing” (72).  Despite his tendency 
to embellish his deeds, what he actually accomplished over the ensuing 
months was quite enough to cement his reputation. 
 
By June 1950, Nichols had been elevated to the rank of warrant officer, and 
soon after the war began he was commissioned and quickly promoted to 
captain in recognition of his accomplishments.  As North Korean troops 
overran the U. S. airfield at Suwon, Nichols led a South Korean force back to 
the field to destroy abandoned U.S. aircraft.  Soon after that he flew the first 
of fifty air reconnaissance missions over North Korea, spotting eighteen 
Soviet-made fighters on the ground, which led to a successful bombing 
mission that was based on his reporting.  Next he saved the life of the Korean 
Air Force chief of staff whose jeep had flipped over in a swamp.  In July 1950 
he was wounded leading a South Korean patrol that stopped a larger North 
Korean assault force attempting to infiltrate Taegu Airfield.  In early August 
he led a mission to recover vital components of a disabled T-34 tank while 
under fire, though in that case it seems Nichols once again inflated his role.  
Still, after just a few months Nichols had engaged in actions that earned him 
an Air Medal, a Distinguished Flying Cross, a Soldier’s Medal for heroism not 
involving combat, a Purple Heart, and a Silver Star, the latter for the T-34 
mission, which allowed U. S. forces to exploit a vulnerability in the tank’s 
armor. 
 
One event that mars Nichols’ reputation even more than his tendency to 
inflate his role in action was his silence and participation in a thirty-one-year 
cover-up of the South Korean massacre of suspected communist civilians and 
prisoners.  Nichols witnessed one of the largest of these massacres near 
Taejon in July 1950, which the U. S. government steadfastly denied, then later 
blamed on North Korea when the bodies of several thousand South Korean 
civilians were discovered.  American witnesses to similar killings did 
complain, and the U. S. Ambassador raised the issue with President Rhee, 
which at least slowed the pace and scope of the murders.  The South Korean 
government did not acknowledge these shameful actions until 2005, when 
former policemen admitted their role in the killings as part of an investigation 
by the Korean government’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  That 
some American witnesses and the U. S. Government chose to look the other 
way for fifty-five years is an inexcusable blemish on our nation’s sometimes 
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questionable role in Asian affairs.  Likewise, Nichols’ silence does him no 
credit, no matter what the motive. 
 
Nothing can excuse such behavior, but nonetheless, Nichols continued to 
provide vital intelligence.  With American forces hunkered into a defensive 
posture on the Pusan Perimeter, Nichols drew on the capabilities of a North 
Korean army radio operator and cryptographer who had fled his post in 1949 
with sensitive codebooks. At that time, Nichols had the defector, Cho Yong Il, 
commissioned in the South Korean Air Force and placed in command of a 
radio intercept facility near Seoul. Within a few weeks, the war started and the 
unit fled southward. Cho found himself at Taegu, inside the Pusan Perimeter, 
where he and his men set up radio receivers and began monitoring North 
Korean messages. With results comparable to the breaking of German and 
Japanese codes in World War II, Cho’s unit fully capitalized on the North 
Korean failure to change their codes after he escaped with copies. Perhaps the 
theft even went unreported lest Cho’s former commander bear the 
responsibility as well as the fatal consequences of Cho’s actions.   
 
Whatever the reason, Nichols was delighted to find that Cho had taken the 
initiative to begin the intercepts at Taegu. He immediately ordered Cho’s unit 
to set up shop in his own Taegu compound, where they established an 
efficient system of interpreting the intercepted messages and conveying the 
information to nearby Army and Air Force headquarters.  Partridge’s Fifth Air 
Force thus had plenty of targeting information and it acted quickly to strike 
troop formations, supply lines, and artillery emplacements.  The information 
was vital in defending the Perimeter, and Nichols soon moved to consolidate 
all cryptological efforts under his control, making he and the information he 
produced essential to the American war effort.  Nichols’ proximity to the 
battlefield negated the typical problem with the analysis and dissemination of 
intelligence data, which was a delay in conveying actionable intelligence to 
field commanders.  Nichols’ unit had almost immediate access to Army and 
Air Force intelligence officers who could operationalize the data quickly.  The 
U. S. Army commander in Korea, as well as the South Korean government, 
credited Nichols with contributing to saving both the U. S. Eighth Army and 
the Pusan Perimeter.  With no clearly defined wartime mission, Nichols saw 
opportunity and grabbed it.  The Air Force was soon clamoring for even more. 
 
By August 1950, Partridge was seeking additional targets for his bombers. 
Nichols coordinated with South Korean intelligence officers and soon 
recruited forty-eight agents to be dropped behind enemy lines after a rapid 
one-week training program in Japan.  The results of that effort and several 
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subsequent infiltrations could be considered disastrous, with very few of the 
agents ever returning safely.  Many South Korean veterans still resent that 
Nichols was seemingly insensate of the heavy toll. 
 
In the wake of MacArthur’s Inchon landing, which placed his army in the rear 
of North Korean forces besieging the Pusan Perimeter, allied troops broke out 
of the perimeter and joined in chasing the North Koreans nearly to the 
Chinese border.  Nichols followed along in the wake of the advance, 
eventually searching Kim Il Sung’s home and offices in Pyongyang.  His 
cryptology team set up shop at an airfield forty miles north of the capital, but 
they had far less success cracking Chinese radio codes.  In an intelligence 
failure that exceeded even the debacle of June 1950, allied forces were caught 
totally unawares when they suddenly faced hordes of Chinese troops.  To their 
everlasting shame, both MacArthur and Willoughby callously disregarded all 
evidence that the Chinese were not only massed on the border, they were 
already fighting in North Korea.  Despite ample evidence of the presence of 
Chinese forces, MacArthur underestimated Chinese resolve and stupidly 
ordered U. S. troops to advance all the way to the Yalu River.  This was a 
threat Chairman Mao could not brook.  On November 25, 300,000 Chinese 
soldiers fell on the unsuspecting Americans and their allies.  Most of them 
had believed they would be home for Christmas.  Instead they were swept up 
in one of the nation’s most costly military disasters and sent reeling back 
across the thirty-eighth parallel. 
 
Nichols’ career benefitted from the catastrophe, though.  His actions, as 
noted, far exceeded the scope of duties any AFOSI agent would have been 
expected to perform, so Partridge created a totally new outfit under the 
auspices of the Air Intelligence Service Squadron. It soon took on the name 
NICK, and it was the foundation of subsequent Air Force Special Operations 
functions.  Reporting directly to Partridge, Nichols was charged with 
conducting sabotage and guerrilla activities behind enemy lines.  As a result, 
NICK was staffed largely with South Korean Air Force personnel.  Nichols and 
his team soon scored another intelligence coup in April 1951, when they 
recovered vital parts and information from a MiG-15 that had crash landed 
behind enemy lines.  Nichols received a Distinguished Service Cross for that 
mission, which prompted engineers to improve the performance of the 
American F-86 Sabre so that it could outmaneuver the Soviet fighter.  
Nichols’ power expanded even further in the aftermath of that mission, with 
Partridge tasking him to gather intelligence information “by any means 
necessary” (103).  By the end of 1952, Nichols’ spy network and intelligence 
empire had grown from a modest start to a squadron with fifty sub-
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detachments scattered across the peninsula.  Over 900 Korean agents were at 
his disposal, along with fifty-two U. S. Air Force personnel.  The unit’s 
activities were marked by some outstanding successes, such as the recovery of 
an intact MiG-15 instrument panel from another crashed jet, but also by 
continued disaster, such as the failed mission to blow up two railroad bridges 
from which fourteen of fifteen South Korean agents did not return. 
 
Nichols’ power was nearly absolute, and thus he grew in many ways to be 
absolutely corrupt.  Rumors of his homosexual behavior began to surface, and 
South Korean veterans recalled how handsome young airmen would visit 
Nichols in his quarters.  At some point a gunfight erupted in his quarters 
when Nichols was apparently attacked by a half-dozen South Koreans 
resentful of his callous profligacy with their lives.  Nichols killed three of them 
and the others were arrested and tried.  Other incidents reveal the extent that 
power may have corrupted him.  Once he may have ordered a South Korean 
Military Policeman dropped behind enemy lines as punishment for arresting 
two of his friends.  In another incident, Nichols ordered a North Korean 
officer suspected of murdering Chinese prisoners of war who collaborated 
with Americans to be flown over the Han River and pushed out of the plane 
without a parachute. 
 
With the signing of the armistice ending the Korean War, Nichols remained at 
the helm of his extensive spy network for another four years with a very brief 
interlude in a U.S. assignment that was cut short after Nichols appealed to 
Partridge to return to Korea.  By 1955, Nichols was thriving in Korea as 
commander of the Air Force’s 6006th Intelligence Squadron with the rank of 
major.  The expanded number of Air Force personnel under his command 
apparently led to his undoing.  Complaints began to flow in about his 
mistreatment of the troops assigned to the squadron.  Nichols behaved no 
differently than he ever did, but he seemed not to grasp that he was no longer 
pushing around South Koreans fearful of their own government.  He was now 
dealing primarily with Americans, and his “unusual and abnormal conduct,” 
not to mention his excessive weight of 260 pounds, was not what they 
expected of their commander, especially when the war was over (146).  By 
1957, few of his men even knew what Nichols had accomplished during the 
war.  Eventually, his old unit, AFOSI, conducted an investigation into some of 
the allegations leveled against him.  While the details leading to Nichols’ 
eventual dismissal from command were not located by Harden, one may 
surmise that the involvement of AFOSI, whose mission was the investigation 
of serious crimes and counterintelligence issues, meant that something other 
than poor leadership lay at the root of the problem.  Harden poses some 
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tantalizing possibilities.  Nichols apparently amassed a small fortune during 
his service in Korea, so there is the suspicion of financial irregularities or 
outright theft.  It is also possible that his homosexual tendencies were finally 
exposed as more than rumor.  Lastly, Harden raises the prospect that Nichols’ 
close relationship with Syngman Rhee had outlived its usefulness to the U. S. 
Government.  Rhee was hanging on to power by a thin margin and the use of 
strongman tactics bordering on a dictatorship.  He and his henchmen were 
increasingly seen as a threat to U. S. interests in the region. 
 
Nichols was relieved of command in July 1957.  By October he was under 
psychiatric evaluation in an Air Force hospital in Japan, despite not a single 
shred of evidence of mental disorder in any of his performance reports or his 
medical and service records.  For ten days doctors could find nothing wrong, 
then Nichols grew impatient with the involuntary stay.  He lashed out and 
became “agitated, disoriented, and very aggressive” (159).  Nichols was 
sedated with Thorazine and transferred to a hospital in Florida.  Confinement 
to an institution with plenty of time to reflect on his traumatic experiences 
and years of accumulated stress must have led Nichols to the point of 
questioning his own sanity.  He was eventually diagnosed as schizophrenic, 
leading to a tripled dose of Thorazine and finally to electroshock treatments 
as his condition deteriorated.  He was stabilized, released from active duty, 
and placed in disability retirement status in the spring of 1958.  Nichols was 
permanently separated from the Air Force four years later with a 70 disability 
rating. 
 
The disgraced spymaster never fully recovered from the shame of dismissal 
and the mental health diagnosis.  The remainder of his life is marked by a 
series of sad events, including an arrest for child molestation in 1966, 
followed by another arrest for raping a 15-year-old girl.  The 320 pound 
retiree skipped bail and fled to Mexico with the son he claimed to have 
fathered with a Korean woman.  He said he had married the woman in Korea, 
but she died in childbirth.  No one else ever seemed to know anything about 
her.  After nearly a year in Mexico, Nichols was eventually convinced to return 
and face the charges with the assistance of a prominent attorney.   He was 
found not guilty of the sexual assault charge, and the rape charge was 
dismissed when the girl changed her story. 
 
Nichols settled down in Florida to begin work on his autobiography and his 
life took on a semblance of normalcy.  He was invited on a few occasions to 
address special agents in training at the AFOSI Academy at Bolling AFB, and 
he returned to Korea in 1987 at the invitation of his former South Korean Air 
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Force comrades.  There he was feted and hailed as a war hero.  Shortly after 
returning home, however, he was again charged with a sexual offense and he 
pled nolo contendere to lewd and lascivious behavior.  He was fined and 
ordered to attend counseling, but another arrest followed six months later.  
Nichols was confined to a psychiatric ward in a VA hospital in Alabama until 
his death in 1992 at age sixty-nine, a disgraced and forgotten hero of a 
forgotten war.  Nichols determined to remain tied for eternity to the shadowy 
world of the spy.  By his instructions, the marker on his grave bears no 
mention of his military service or of Korea.  It does however bear the name of 
his supposed Korean wife. 
 
Spy stories can often lead one to conclude that spying is not a business for the 
faint of heart.  This is certainly true of Don Nichols, who embraced his 
mission with a relish that indicates he was interested only in results, not in 
how they were achieved.  He was a man willing to do the dirty work and get 
results no matter the cost.  In that respect he was no worse than those for 
whom he worked.  His superiors welcomed his information, praised his skills, 
and looked the other way.  Were it not for his disreputable personal conduct, 
he would undoubtedly be celebrated as a hero for the deeds he performed for 
his country.  Despite his braggadocio he did risk his life on numerous 
occasions to accomplish his mission.  He expected no less from others and he 
could not have been an easy man to work for.  In allowing Nichols so many 
years of virtually unsupervised free rein, the Air Force contributed to letting 
the renegade genie that was Don Nichols out of his bottle.  Getting him back 
inside was an equally ugly affair that does his handlers no credit.  Blaine 
Harden’s book adeptly lays out the whole process in this well written, stranger 
than life tale of a man who would be king—of spies. 
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